Month: March 2016

On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Wittman v. Personhuballah. In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District by increasing the percentage of African-American voters in the district. In 2013, plaintiffs, who reside in the Third District, sued state election officials, arguing that the District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court agreed and held the districting plan to be unconstitutional, but the U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its intervening decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. On remand, the district court held that the redistricting plan failed strict scrutiny and ordered the Virginia General Assembly to devise a remedial plan. When the Assembly did not do so the court devised its own remedial plan and ordered election officials to implement it. -- On further appeal, there are four questions now before the Supreme Court: (1) Whether the court below erred in failing to make the required finding that race rather than politics predominated in District 3, where there is no dispute that politics explains the Enacted Plan; (2) whether the court below erred in relieving plaintiffs of their burden to show an alternative plan that achieves the General Assembly's political goals, is comparably consistent with traditional districting principles, and brings about greater racial balance than the Enacted Plan; (3) whether, regardless of any other error, the finding of a Shaw violation by the court below was based on clearly erroneous fact-finding; (4) whether the majority erred in holding that the Enacted Plan fails strict scrutiny because it increased District 3's black voting-age population percentage above the benchmark percentage, when the undisputed evidence establishes that the increase better complies with neutral principles than would reducing the percentage and no racial bloc voting analysis would support a reduction capable of realistically securing Section 5 preclearance. -- To discuss the case, we have Derek Muller, who is Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law.

On March 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Simmons v. Himmelreich. This case arises from a lawsuit filed by federal prisoner Walter Himmelreich as the result of an assault by a fellow prisoner. Although several of Himmelreich’s claims were dismissed in an initial round of litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allowed two to proceed on remand, of which one was a “Bivens” claim made against certain officials in their individual capacities for failing to protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court ultimately dismissed the claim, concluding that the “judgment bar” of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) precluded Himmelreich from pursuing a Bivens action against the officials individually when his underlying FTCA claim against the government had failed. On a subsequent appeal the Sixth Circuit disagreed and again revived the Bivens claim, reasoning that the grounds on which the FTCA claim had failed--namely, an exception to liability--indicated a lack of subject matter jurisdiction that did not trigger the FTCA judgment bar. The federal officials sought certiorari. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether, in an FTCA action brought under Section 1346(b), a final judgment dismissing the claim on the ground that relief is precluded by one of the FTCA exceptions to liability, 28 U.S.C. § 2680, bars a subsequent action by the claimant against the federal employees whose acts gave rise to the FTCA claim. -- To discuss the case, we have Aaron Nielson, who is Associate Professor of Law at Brigham Young University Law School.

On March 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (consolidated with its companion case, Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust). -- Concerned that its public utilities were on the verge of insolvency but could not obtain Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief under federal law, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico attempted to circumvent this obstacle by passing its own municipal bankruptcy law. This law, the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act expressly provides different protections for creditors than those in federal Chapter 9. -- Investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico’s public utilities worried that it might seek relief under the new Puerto Rico law and sued in federal court, challenging the law’s validity and seeking injunctive relief. The district court enjoined the enforcement of the new law and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Puerto Rico sought certiorari. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code, although it does not apply to Puerto Rico, nevertheless preempts the Puerto Rico statute creating a mechanism for the Commonwealth’s public utilities to restructure their debts. Justice Alito is recused from this case. -- To discuss the case, we have David Skeel, who is the S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and who submitted an amicus brief in support of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

On February 29, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Voisine v. United States. Stephen Voisine was convicted in 2003 of assaulting a woman with whom he was in a domestic relationship--a misdemeanor violation of a Maine statute. In 2009 Voisine turned a rifle over to federal officials who were investigating him for a separate alleged crime. When investigators discovered Voisine’s 2003 misdemeanor assault, they charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which makes it a federal crime for a person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to “possess in or affecting commerce[] any firearm or ammunition.” In turn, a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" is defined in § 921(a)(33)(A) as an offense that (1) is a misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal law, and (2) “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force…committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim” or by a person in a similar domestic relationship with the victim. -- Voisine challenged the § 922(g)(9) charge, arguing that under his Maine conviction offensive physical contact, as opposed to one causing bodily injury, was not a “use of physical force” and thus not a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(A). The district court rejected this argument and Voisine pled guilty on condition that he be able to appeal the court’s ruling. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but the Supreme Court subsequently granted Voisine’s petition for certiorari, vacated the First Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the intervening 2014 Supreme Court decision United States v. Castleman. That decision held the requirement of “physical force” satisfied, for purposes of § 922(g)(9), by the degree of force that supports a common-law battery conviction--but it did not resolve whether a conviction with the mens rea of reckless--as under the Maine statute--would qualify. On remand the First Circuit again rejected Voisine’s challenge and held that his Maine conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” -- The Supreme Court again granted certiorari to address the following question: Whether a misdemeanor crime with the mens rea of recklessness qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9). -- To discuss the case, we have Ryan Scott, who is Associate Professor at Indiana University Maurer School of Law.