Month: October 2017

On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, a dispute involving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which in exchange for federal funding requires that states provide a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to disabled children by means of a tailored “individualized education program” (IEP). In its 1982 decision Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester County. v. Rowley (Rowley), the Supreme Court indicated that the FAPE requirement is satisfied when an IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable the [disabled] child to receive educational benefits.”

Endrew F. is a student with autism who received annual IEPs from the Douglas County School District from preschool through the fourth grade. At that point, however, his parents felt his progress to be stagnating, and when the school district proposed a similar IEP for the fifth grade, Endrew’s parents moved him to a specialized private school where he made significant progress. School district officials thereafter presented Endrew’s parents with a revised IEP, but the parents considered it little better than the previous version. The parents sought reimbursement of private school tuition costs by filing an IDEA complaint with the Colorado Department of Education. Their claim was denied, however, and the denial was affirmed by both a federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit concluded that under Rowley, the FAPE requirement was satisfied so long as the IEP conferred more than a minimal educational benefit.

By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that to meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances,” a more demanding standard than the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis one. The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings under the corrected standard.

To discuss the case, we have Daniel Woodring, principal at Woodring Law Firm.

On March 28, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Moore v. Texas, a habeas corpus dispute regarding the scope of the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia that the execution of a mentally disabled person would violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on “cruel and unusual punishments.”

Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally shooting a sales clerk during a failed robbery attempt. Finding Moore to be intellectually disabled under current medical diagnostic standards set forth in the latest editions of the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) manual and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and invoking Atkins, a state court recommended granting Moore habeas relief in the form of life imprisonment or a new trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected that recommendation based on its 2004 decision in Ex Parte Briseno, which relied on standards set forth in a predecessor manual to the AAIDD and a series of evidentiary factors. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately determined that Moore had failed to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, and denied relief.

By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed to comply with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents. By rejecting the habeas court’s application of contemporary medical guidance and clinging to the outdated and nonclinical factors set forth in Briseno, the Supreme Court indicated, the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed adequately to inform itself of the medical community’s diagnostic framework as required by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Hall v. Florida. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Chief Justice dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.

To discuss the case, we have Joanmarie Davoli.

On April 18, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc., v. Nevils. Under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may contract with private carriers to provide federal employees health insurance. FEHBA expressly provides, however, that the terms of any such contract relating to “the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits)” will “supersede and preempt any State or local or law, or any regulation issued thereunder” relating to health insurance or plans. Here, OPM’s contracts with private insurance carriers provide, among other things, for reimbursement and subrogation. When Jodie Nevils, a former federal employee insured under a FEHBA plan offered by Coventry Health Care of Missouri (Coventry) was injured in an automobile accident, Coventry paid Nevils’ medical expenses. Nevils sued the driver who caused his injuries and obtained a settlement award. Coventry, invoking its OPM contract, then asserted a lien of approximately $6,600 against Nevils’ settlement proceeds to cover the medical bills Coventry had paid for Nevils. He paid off the lien, but then filed a class action suit against Coventry in Missouri state court, claiming the insurance company had unlawfully obtained reimbursement and noting that Missouri law does not permit subrogation or reimbursement in this context. The trial court granted judgment for Coventry on the grounds that FEHBA allowed Coventry’s contract terms to override state law prohibitions. The Missouri Supreme Court, however, reversed, relying on a “presumption against preemption” that excluded subrogation and reimbursement from FEHBA’s preemptive scope.

By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that Missouri’s prohibitions on contractual subrogation and reimbursement “relate to … payments with respect to benefits,” and are therefore preempted by FEHBA. The Court further held that FEHBA’s preemption regime comports with the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, because the statute itself and not the OPM contract triggers federal preemption. All other justices joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court except Justice Gorsuch, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.


To discuss the case, we have George Horvath, a Post-Doctoral Fellow and Lecturer at Berkeley Law.