Month: March 2018

In this rapid-response episode, Thomas and Andrew discuss the scandal regarding Cambridge Analytica.  Is there a legal angle?  Have crimes been committed?  Listen and find out! In the pre-show segment, Andrew helps out our reporters by giving theme the question they need to be asking regarding Stormy Daniels, which is:  "Now that you’ve acknowledged that you’re DD, and you’ve sued Stormy Daniels for $20 million, can you tell us what claims you had against Ms. Daniels that you believe you settled in that agreement?  What could you have sued her for?"  You're welcome. That segues into the "A" segment, where the guys discuss the differences (and one strange overlap) between the recent lawsuit filed by Karen McDougal and the top-of-Yodel-Mountain Stormy Daniels lawsuit. After the main segment, we tackle a listener question regarding the difference between textualism and originalism, inspired by our most recent episode, Episode 157. Finally, we end with an all-new TTTBE #68 that requires some math to figure out the appropriate measure of damages for breach of contract.  Remember that you can play along with #TTTBE by retweeting our episode on Twitter or sharing it on Facebook along with your guess.  We'll release the answer on next Tuesday's episode along with our favorite entry! Recent Appearances None!  Have us on your show! Show Notes & Links

1. This is the National Review article that actually gets Stormy's story right.
2. Here's Mike Murphy's article expressing skepticism of CA's claims.
3. This is the Price v. Facebook class action civil lawsuit, arising out of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.  And here's the statement from NY Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.
4. If you wanted to set up a SuperPAC, Andrew's old pals at Covington & Burling have drafted a simple how-to guide for you.
5. Finally, here's a hilarious Tweet from Peter Drice Wright that highlights a key problem with textualism.

Support us on Patreon at:  patreon.com/law Follow us on Twitter:  @Openargs Facebook:  https://www.facebook.com/openargs/ Don't forget the OA Facebook Community! And email us at openarguments@gmail.com  

On March 19, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Sveen v. Melin, a case involving the relationship between Minnesota’s revocation-upon-divorce statute and the U.S. Constitution’s “Contracts clause,” which declares that no state may pass a law “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”
In 2002, Minnesota amended its probate code to incorporate life insurance beneficiary designations into its revocation-upon-divorce statute. Mark Sveen purchased a life insurance policy in 1997, months before marrying Kaye Melin, who Sveen designated as the primary beneficiary on the policy. His two adult children, Ashley and Antone Sveen, were listed as contingent beneficiaries. Melin and Sveen divorced in 2007, but Sveen never removed Melin as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy.
Both Melin and Sveen’s adult children sought to claim the insurance proceeds. In light of Minnesota’s extension of the revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance policies, Sveen’s insurance company sought clarification in federal district court regarding whether Melin should still be considered the primary beneficiary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sveens, applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively to remove Melin as a beneficiary.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed that judgment, however, reasoning that retroactive application of the statute in these circumstances would violate the Contracts clause. The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to consider that core issue: whether the application of a revocation-upon-divorce statute to a contract signed before the statute’s enactment violates the contracts clause.
To discuss the case, we have Prof. James Ely, Professor of Law Emeritus at Vanderbilt University Law School.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.