Category: 3-LawSometimeCommentary

Today's special episode devotes all three segments to the tragedy in Charlottesville, VA. First, the guys answer a question regarding the police declaration that the Unite the Right rally as an "unlawful gathering" right before the scheduled start time, illustrating the principles of time, place, and manner restrictions. During the main segment, Andrew breaks down the law of hate speech and also explains the charges filed against the individual who drove his car into the protestors. After that, Andrew answers another listener question, this one regarding Texas A&M's decision to cancel a "White Lives Matter" rally in light of the tragedy in Charlottesville. Finally, we end with an all-new Thomas Takes the Bar Exam Question #37 about the failure to timely pay on an installment contract.  Remember that you can play along with #TTTBE by retweeting our episode Tweet along with your guess.  We'll release the answer on next Tuesday's episode along with our favorite entry! Recent Appearances Andrew was a guest on Episode #15 of the Right to Reason podcast, arguing politics and whether your vote can be a message. Show Notes & Links

1. Our discussion with Travis Wester regarding the Berkeley College Republicans lawsuit took place back in Opening Arguments Episode #73.  You might want to re-listen!
2. This is a link to the Vox timeline of the events in Charlottesville.
3. Here is Washington Post reporter Joe Heim's Twitter feed, showing a picture of the heavily armed "citizens" attending the rally.
4. This is the preliminary injunction ruling on the motion filed by Jason Kessler, organizer of the "Unite the Right" rally.
5. The key case setting forth the principles of time, place & manner restrictions is Ward v. Rock Against Racism 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
6. The "fire in a crowded theater" case is Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919) -- give it a read and you'll understand (and appreciate!) why it is no longer good law.
7. The modern rule on hate speech stems from Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
8. This is the DOJ's list of hate crimes laws.
9. Virginia's second-degree murder statute is Code of VA § 18.2-32.
10. You can read Texas A&M University's statement cancelling the "White Lives Matter" protest scheduled for Sept. 11 here.
11. You can also check out Andrew's rockin' 1980s case, Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).

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Today's show is a companion to Episode 67 of Serious Inquiries Only regarding the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. We begin, however, with a question about progressivity and fines from listener Noah Lugeons. In the main segment, Andrew tells the story of how Michael Dukakis, Slayer, and race-baiting by Newt Gingrich led to the worst aspects of the omnibus crime bill. Next, the guys cover perhaps their most anticipated "Breakin' Down the Law" ever:  defending Milo Yiannopoulos, along with the ACLU. Finally, we end with the answer to Thomas Take the Bar Exam Question #36 regarding defamation.  And don't forget to play along by following our Twitter feed (@Openargs) and/or our Facebook Page and quoting the Tweet or Facebook Post that announces this episode along with your guess and reason(s)! Recent Appearances Andrew was a guest on Episode #15 of the Right to Reason podcast, arguing politics and whether your vote can be a message. Show Notes & Links

1. You should be listening to Serious Inquiries Only.
2. This is the text of  the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
3. This is the longitudinal Gallup study showing the last 80 years of support for the death penalty.
4. And here is the draft of the lawsuit filed by the ACLU against WMATA on behalf of Milo, PETA, and a family planning company.

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On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, a dispute over the proper venue for a patent infringement suit. Section 1400(b) of the patent venue statute states in relevant part that a civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district “where the defendant resides.” In the 1957 case Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of section 1400(b) a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of incorporation--a narrower understanding of corporate “residence” than that applicable under section 1391 of the general venue statute. Under section 1391, a corporate defendant is typically deemed to reside in any judicial district where it is subject to the court’s “personal jurisdiction” with respect to the civil action in question. -- TC Heartland LLC (Heartland) is organized under Indiana law and headquartered there. Kraft Food Brands LLC (Kraft) sued Heartland in federal district court in Delaware (where Kraft is organized), alleging that products Heartland shipped to Delaware infringed on Kraft’s patents for similar products. Heartland moved to dismiss the claim or transfer venue to Indiana, arguing that it did not reside in Delaware for purposes of section 1400(b). The district court rejected these arguments and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied mandamus relief, because its circuit precedent had concluded that more recent statutory amendments to section 1391 had effectively superseded the Fourco interpretation of “reside” in section 1400(b) and thus the broader understanding expressed in section 1391 now applied to section 1400(b) too. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the amendments to section 1391 did not modify the meaning of section 1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco; as applied to domestic corporations, “residence” for purposes of section 1400(b) still refers only to the state of incorporation. All other members of the Court joined in Justice Thomas’ opinion except Justice Gorsuch, who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have J. Devlin Hartline, who is Director, Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) and Adjunct Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.

The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA) provides an abbreviated pathway for obtaining Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug that is biosimilar to an already licensed biological product. Among other things, BPCIA provisions require applicants for approval of a new biosimilar to provide the manufacturer of the already licensed product with a notice of commercial marketing and certain information about the biosimilar. Failure to comply permits the manufacturer to pursue infringement litigation against the applicant on an accelerated basis. -- Amgen claims to hold patents on methods of manufacturing and using filgrastim--a biologic used to stimulate the production of white blood cells--and markets one such product, Neupogen. Sandoz sought FDA approval to market a biosimilar called Zarxio. When the FDA accepted Sandoz’s application for review, Sandoz notified Amgen that Sandoz intended to market Zarxio upon receipt of FDA approval. Sandoz also indicated that it would not share with Amgen the relevant application and manufacturing information as required by the BPCIA and invited Amgen immediately to sue for infringement. Amgen did so, and further asserted claims for “unlawful” conduct in violation of California’s unfair competition law. The basis for the latter claims was Sandoz’s alleged failure to comply with the BPCIA requirements that Sandoz (a) share the application and manufacturing information pertaining to Zarxio, and (b) provide a notice of commercial marketing prior to obtaining FDA licensure. Amgen sought injunctive relief in federal district court to enforce both requirements against Sandoz, which counterclaimed for declaratory judgments that Amgen’s patent was invalid and not infringed, and that Sandoz had not violated the BPCIA. -- While the litigation was pending, the FDA licensed Zarxio, and Sandoz provided Amgen with further notice of commercial marketing. The district court thereafter granted partial judgment in favor of Sandoz on its BPCIA counterclaims and dismissed Amgen’s unfair competition claims with prejudice. A divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case. The Federal Circuit held that Sandoz had not violated the BPCIA disclosure requirements and that Amgen could not pursue state law remedies to enforce the BPCIA. The court also held that an applicant may provide effective notice of commercial market only after FDA licensure and therefore enjoined Sandoz from marketing Zarxio until 180 days passed after Sandoz’s second notice. -- By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the BPCIA’s requirement on sharing application and marketing information is not enforceable by an injunction under federal law, but that the Federal Circuit should determine on remand whether a state-law injunction is available. The Supreme Court further held that an applicant may provide the requisite notice of commercial marketing before obtaining FDA licensure; therefore Sandoz fully complied with this requirement through its initial notice, the Federal Circuit erred in enjoining Sandoz from marketing Zarxio on this basis, and Amgen’s state law unfair competition claim predicated on the view that the BPCIA forbids pre-licensure notice must fail. Justice Breyer issued a concurring opinion. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Erika Lietzan, who is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri School of Law.

In today's episode, we interview Geoffrey Blackwell from the American Atheists Legal Center. First, the guys break down the recent lawsuit filed by two LGBTQ advocacy organizations challenging President Trump's tweets regarding transgender service in the military. During the main segment, we ask Geoff what the AALC does, what kinds of cases are on his plate, and whether Trinity Lutheran v. Comer is as bad as we think it is. After that, Andrew answers a question from listener Thomas S. regarding Google's firing of an employee who wrote a bizarre, 10-page anti-woman manifesto. Finally, we end with an all-new Thomas Takes the Bar Exam Question #36 about defamation.  Remember that you can play along with #TTTBE by retweeting our episode Tweet along with your guess.  We'll release the answer on next Tuesday's episode along with our favorite entry! Recent Appearances None!  Have us on your show! Show Notes & Links

1. Give Geoff's podcast, All Too Common Law, a listen!
2. Here is a link to the Doe v. Trump lawsuit filed Aug. 9, 2017 challenging Trump's tweets.
3. This is the Slate piece calling the lawsuit "ingenious"; Andrew disagrees.
4. And this is the (weird) Mattis internal DOD memo about "ethics" to which the guys refer during the show.
5. Finally, this is the Google manifesto referred to during the "C" segment of the show.

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On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court decided California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities. Between 2007 and 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings raised capital through a number of public securities offerings. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) purchased some of these securities. In 2008, a putative class action alleging federal securities law violations was filed against respondents--various financial firms involved in underwriting the offerings--in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Because the complaint was filed on behalf of all persons who purchased the identified securities, petitioner CalPERS fell within the putative class. In 2011, however, CalPERS filed a separate action, alleging identical violations against respondent firms in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. That suit was then transferred and consolidated with other related litigation in the Southern District of New York. The New York class action then settled, but CalPERS opted out of the settlement. Respondents thereafter moved to dismiss CalPERS’ separate suit based on Securities Act language providing that “[i]n no event shall any such action be brought … more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public,” the CalPERS suit having fallen outside the three-year limit. CalPERS argued that the time limit was equitably tolled during the pendency of the class action, but the district court rejected the claim and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that CalPERS’ untimely filing of its individual complaint more than three years after the relevant securities offering was grounds for dismissal. The three-year limitation in the Securities Act, the Court indicated, is a “statute of repose” and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Mark Chenoweth, who is General Counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation.

Today's show is a deep dive into the current Constitutional status of affirmative action in higher education. We begin, however, with a question about Donald Trump from conservative listener Sage Scott.  Is it really a big deal to just listen to the Russians?  Couldn't you just pay them if their stuff turns out to be useful?  No.  The answer is no. In the main segment, the guys outline the current state of the law of affirmative action in higher education as set forth in Fisher v. University of Texas-Austin, 136 S.Ct. 1398 (2016) ("Fisher II"), and what that means in light of the Trump Administration's recent comments that it plans to focus DOJ resources on challenging college admission programs that (supposedly) disadvantage white people. Next, in a follow-up to the John Oliver defamation lawsuit we discussed in Episode 84, "Closed Arguments" returns with a dissection of the best legal brief ever written, an amicus curiae brief filed by Jamie Lynn Crofts of the ACLU of West Virginia in support of Oliver.  Andrew tries to contain his jealousy. Finally, we end with the answer to Thomas Take the Bar Exam Question #35 regarding a physician's duty regarding releasing patients who are a danger to themselves or others.  And don't forget to play along by following our Twitter feed (@Openargs) and/or our Facebook Page and quoting the Tweet or Facebook Post that announces this episode along with your guess and reason(s)! Recent Appearances Andrew had a busy week!  He was on the follow shows:

• Episode #17 of the  Squaring the Strange podcast
• Episode #14 of the Odd Atheist Friends podcast; and
• Episode #113 of the Utah Outcasts podcast.

Show Notes & Links

1. Here is a link to 52 U.S.C. § 30121, which you can read for yourself plainly prohibits virtually all contact between foreign nationals and any candidate for federal, state, or even local office.
2. You can read the August 1, 2017 New York Times story on how the Trump Administration plans to challenge affirmative action in college admissions here.
3. The most recent Supreme court case on affirmative action in higher education is Fisher v. University of Texas-Austin, 136 S.Ct. 1398 (2016) ("Fisher II"); Andrew also referenced Fisher I, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
4. We first discussed Bob Murray's defamation lawsuit against John Oliver in Episode #84, and you can read the ACLU's outstanding amicus brief here.

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On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, formerly known as Lynch v. Morales-Santana. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for derivative acquisition of U.S. citizenship from birth, by a child born abroad, when one parent is a U.S. citizen and the other is not. At the relevant time here, the INA required the U.S.-citizen parent to have ten years’ physical presence in the United States prior to the child’s birth, at least five of which were after attaining age 14. Although the rule applies in full to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, there is an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother, whose citizenship can be transmitted to a child born abroad if she has lived continuously in the United States for just one year prior to the child’s birth. -- Morales-Santana, who was born in the Dominican Republic, asserted U.S. citizenship from birth based on the citizenship of his father--but his father had fallen 20 days short of satisfying the requirement of five years’ physical presence after attaining age 14. In 2000, the government sought to remove Morales-Santana as a result of several criminal convictions, classifying him as alien rather than citizen because of his father’s failure to satisfy the full physical presence requirement. The immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s citizenship claim and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his subsequent motion to reopen proceedings on the claim that the INA’s gender-based rule violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause--but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding the differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers unconstitutional and acknowledging Morales-Santana’s U.S. citizenship. -- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a vote of 8-0, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that (1) the gender line Congress drew in the INA, creating an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother but not for such a father, to the physical-presence requirement, violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause as the Second Circuit had determined; but (2) the remedial course that Congress would most likely have chosen if apprised of this constitutional infirmity would have been not a broader application of the one-year exception but rather preservation of the five-year general rule; thus the Court cannot grant the relief Morales-Santana seeks. Going forward it falls to Congress to select a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender, but in the interim the five-year requirement applies prospectively to children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers just as with such fathers. -- Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, who is President, Committee for Justice; Legal Affairs Fellow, Freedom Works.

In today's episode, Andrew reluctantly -- but definitively -- opines that the Second Circuit got the law right in dismissing out the claims of Davino Watson, who argued that he was falsely imprisoned by the U.S. government for 3 1/2 years. In the pre-show segment, Andrew briefly introduces new FBI Director Christopher Wray as a good nominee by Donald Trump. After that, the guys tackle a follow-up question to Episode #91; namely, isn't "sexual orientation" already a protected class?  Doesn't the law just prohibit discrimination in general?  (No.) In our main segment, Andrew explains why statutes of limitation are necessary and why the Second Circuit got it right in dismissing out Watson's false imprisonment claim even though the circumstances are awful. Next, the guys break down Rod Wheeler's defamation lawsuit against Fox News.  Why is this part of Yodel Mountain?  Listen and find out! Finally, we end with an all-new (and fiendishly hard!) Thomas Takes the Bar Exam Question #35 about a hospital's duty to third parties when releasing a patient with homicidal ideation.  Remember that you can play along with #TTTBE by retweeting our episode Tweet along with your guess.  We'll release the answer on next Tuesday's episode along with our favorite entry! Recent Appearances Andrew had a busy week!  He was on the follow shows:

• Episode #17 of the  Squaring the Strange podcast
• Episode #14 of the Odd Atheist Friends podcast; and
• Episode #113 of the Utah Outcasts podcast.

Show Notes & Links

1. You can listen to the original discussion of anti-discrimination in employment in Episode #91, as well as read the text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
2. This is the trial court's decision in Watson v. U.S. (EDNY 2016), as well as the Second Circuit's decision from Sept. 1, 2017.
3. Here is the Complaint filed by Rod Wheeler against Fox News.

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For today's show, we revisit the topic first discussed in Opening Arguments Episode #60, namely, whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of "sex" implicitly extends to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "sexual orientation" as well. First, however, fan favorite "Breakin' Down the Law" returns with an explanation of civil and criminal asset forfeiture and a new policy announced by Attorney General (for now) Jeff Sessions. In the main segment, we contrast the amicus brief filed by the U.S. Department of Justice in Zarda v. Altitude Express with the 7th Circuit's opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana.  Find out why your government just submitted a brief arguing that employers have the right to hang a sign that says "no homosexuals need apply." After that, Patron Jordan Keith explains a bit more about the TOR browser as a follow-up to Opening Arguments Episode #88's discussion of U.S. v. Matish. Finally, we end with the answer to Thomas Take the Bar Exam Question #34 regarding the rape shield law, FRE 412.  Listen and find out if Thomas makes it back to .500!   And don't forget to play along by following our Twitter feed (@Openargs) and/or our Facebook Page and quoting the Tweet or Facebook Post that announces this episode along with your guess and reason(s)! Recent Appearances: Andrew was just a guest on Episode 15 of Molly Unmormon's "Doubting Dogma" podcast -- give it a listen! Show Notes & Links

1. The relevant statutes for asset forfeiture are 18 U.S.C. § 983 and 21 U.S.C. § 853, and you can also read the 2015 Holder memorandum prohibiting "adoptive forfeitures" by clicking here.
2. We first discussed Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana in Episode #60.
3. And here is the link to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
4. Here is a link to the U.S.'s amicus curiae brief in Zarda v. Altitude Express.
5. This is the text of the opinion in U.S. v. Matish, which we first discussed in Episode #88.
6. And finally, you can read Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by clicking here.

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