Category: 3-LawSometimeCommentary

On April 20, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bernard v. Minnesota, which was consolidated with Birchfield v. North Dakota and Beylund v. Levi. -- In Bernard, William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking, but he denied driving his truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In Birchfield, Danny Birchfield was arrested after failing field sobriety tests after he had driven his vehicle into a ditch, but he refused to consent to a chemical test, resulting in a misdemeanor charge. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law in question violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In Beylund, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence, but only after being informed it was a criminal offense to refuse a blood alcohol test in North Dakota. The test confirmed he was over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence. -- The men in these cases challenged state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test, arguing among other things that the statutes violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected their respective challenges. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court in these consolidated cases is whether, in the absence of a warrant, a state may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person’s blood. -- To discuss the case, we have Jonathan Ellis, who is an Associate at Latham & Watkins.

On May 19, 2016, the Supreme Court decided CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC. In 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit against CRST Van Expedited (CRST) on behalf of approximately 270 female employees. When a number failed to appear for depositions, however, the district court barred the EEOC from pursuing their claims as a discovery sanction. The remaining claims were dismissed on various other grounds, including 67 claims that the district court dismissed for failure of the EEOC to separately investigate, find reasonable cause for, or attempt to conciliate them. In addition, the court awarded CRST some $4.46 million in attorney’s fees and expenses, on the basis that the claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but two claims, vacated the award of fees and costs, and remanded the case. On remand, one of the remaining claims was withdrawn and the other settled. CRST renewed its petition for fees, costs, and expenses, and the district court again awarded it approximately $4.6 million. -- On a second appeal, the Eighth Circuit again reversed the award, finding that claims which had been dismissed for the EEOC’s failure to meet presuit obligations could not serve as grounds for a fees award, and remanding for an individualized determination as to whether other claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. -- The U.S. Supreme Court granted CRST’s subsequent petition for certiorari, vacating the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanding the case by a vote of 8-0. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for a unanimous Court held that a favorable ruling on the merits is not a necessary predicate to find that a defendant is a prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees award. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Kenton J. Skarin, who is an Associate at Jones Day.

On June 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Simmons v. Himmelreich. This case arose out of lawsuits filed by federal prisoner Walter Himmelreich after he was assaulted by a fellow prisoner. Himmelreich’s initial lawsuit, filed against the United States, was ultimately dismissed pursuant to an exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for certain discretionary actions by prison officials. While that suit was still pending, however, Himmelreich filed a second suit: a constitutional tort action against individual Bureau of Prisons employees. When Himmelreich’s initial suit was dismissed, these employee defendants argued that his action against them was foreclosed by the FTCA’s “judgment bar” provision, under which a judgment in an FTCA suit forecloses any future suit against individual employees. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the employees. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the judgment bar provision did not apply to Himmelreich’s suit. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split on whether the judgment bar provision applies to suits that, like Himmelreich’s, are dismissed as falling within an “exception” to the FTCA. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that the FTCA’s judgment bar provision does not apply to claims dismissed because they fall within an FTCA "exception." -- To discuss the case, we have Aaron Nielson, who is Associate Professor of Law at Brigham Young University Law School.

On June 9, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania. Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and his initial attempts to obtain state postconviction relief failed. His subsequent petition for federal habeas relief also failed. He again sought post-conviction penalty-related relief in state court and prevailed in the Court of Common Pleas on a claim of unlawful evidence suppression. On appeal, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the grant of relief and lifted the stay of execution (though a temporary reprieve was later granted by the governor for other reasons). The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Ronald Castille, who had joined the opinion reversing the grant of relief to Williams, had also been the District Attorney for Philadelphia during Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal. In that capacity, Castille had authorized his office to seek the death penalty for Williams. Williams had moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from hearing the appeal of post-conviction relief, but Castille declined to do so. -- The central question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether Justice Castille’s denial of the recusal motion and his subsequent judicial participation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and remanded the case. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that under the Due Process Clause, where a judge has had an earlier significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision in the defendant’s case, the risk of actual bias in the judicial proceeding rises to an unconstitutional level. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Cassandra Burke Robertson, who is Professor of Law, Laura B. Chisolm Distinguished Research Scholar, and Director, Center for Professional Ethics at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

On May 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Wittman v. Personhuballah. In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District by increasing the percentage of African-American voters in the district. In 2013, a number of Third District residents sued state election officials, arguing that the District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court agreed and held the redistricting plan to be unconstitutional, but the U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its intervening decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. On remand, the district court again held that the redistricting plan was unconstitutional and ordered the Virginia General Assembly to devise a remedial plan. When the Assembly did not do so the court devised its own remedial plan and ordered election officials to implement it. -- Ten Members of Congress from Virginia, intervenors in the District Court below, appealed its rejection of the 2012 plan to the Supreme Court, alleging various errors in the District Court’s reasoning. By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer indicated that the intervenors lacked standing to pursue their appeal. -- To discuss the case, we have Derek Muller, who is Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law.

Much of the legal world’s attention was focused this week on Donald Trump’s attacks on Gonzalo Curiel, the federal judge presiding over the Trump University fraud cases in California. The outrage centered on Trump’s insistence that the fact of Curiel’s Mexican ancestry should disqualify him from the case, considering Trump’s declared intent to build a border wall. We discuss Trump’s stance – and its historical antecedents – with Deborah Rhode, founding director of Stanford University’s Center on Ethics. And we sit down with Jeffrey Rosen to talk about the far-reaching legal mind of Justice Louis Brandeis, confirmed to the Supreme Court 100 years ago this month. Rosen is the author of the new book Louis D. Brandeis: An American Prophet.  Transcripts of Amicus are available to Slate Plus members. Sign up for a free Slate Plus trial here. 

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On March 22, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Sturgeon v. Frost. Sturgeon challenged a National Park Service (NPS) ban on the operation of hovercraft on the National River, part of which falls within the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve. The State of Alaska then intervened, challenging NPS’s authority to require its researchers to obtain a permit before engaging in studies of chum and sockeye salmon on the Alagnak River, part of which falls within the boundaries of the Katmai National Park and Preserve. Sturgeon and Alaska contended that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) precludes NPS from regulating activities on state-owned lands and navigable waters that fall within the boundaries of National Park System units in Alaska. The district court ruled in favor of the federal government, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment as to Sturgeon but ordered that Alaska’s case be dismissed for lack of standing. The question before the Supreme Court was whether ANILCA prohibits the National Park Service from exercising regulatory control over state, native corporation, and private Alaska land physically located within the boundaries of the National Park System. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s reading of ANILCA. Taken as whole, the Court indicated, ANILCA “contemplates the possibility that all the land within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska may be treated differently from federally managed preservation areas across the country, and that ‘non-public’ lands within the boundaries of those units may be treated differently from ‘public’ lands within the unit.” -- To discuss the case, we have the Honorable Gale Norton, who served as the 48th U.S. Secretary of the Interior.

On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz. Between 2003 and 2007 Husky International Electronics sold and delivered electronic device components worth more than $160,000 to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. Chrysalis, then under the financial control of Daniel Ritz, failed to pay for the goods and Ritz encouraged the transfer of funds from Chrysalis to various other companies. Ritz held substantial ownership stakes in these companies, which had not given reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Chrysalis funds. -- In May 2009, Husky sued Ritz in federal district court, seeking to hold him personally liable for Chrysalis’s debt. Ritz filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and Husky then filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court alleging actual fraud, to preclude a discharge of Ritz’s debts. The bankruptcy court ruled that Husky had failed to prove actual fraud, however, and the district court affirmed that decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise affirmed the lower court judgments, finding no record evidence of a false representation by the debtor, which the Fifth Circuit deemed a necessary predicate to establish actual fraud. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether the “actual fraud” bar to discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code applies only when the debtor has made a false representation, or whether the bar also applies when the debtor has deliberately obtained money through a fraudulent-transfer scheme that was actually intended to cheat a creditor. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that the term "actual fraud" in Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code encompasses fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false representation. The majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, who is a visiting scholar at Hofstra University Maurice A. Deane School of Law.

On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Sheriff v. Gillie. This case involves litigation between debtors to Ohio institutions and special counsel who sought to collect money owed to the institutions. Two questions were before the Supreme Court: (1) Do special counsel appointed by Ohio’s Attorney General qualify as “state officers” exempt from the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s (FDCPA) governance? (2) Is special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead a false or misleading representation proscribed by FDCPA §1692e? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that special counsel were independent contractors who could not claim an FDCPA exemption and remanded the case for trial on the deceptiveness issue. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that--even assuming for the sake of argument special counsel do not rank as “state officers”--their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead did not offend §1692e. Not fairly described as “false” or “misleading,” the use of the letterhead accurately conveyed that special counsel, in seeking to collect debts owed to the State, do so on behalf of, and as instructed by the Attorney General. -- To discuss the case, we have Jennifer L. Mascott, who is an Olin/Searle Fellow in Law at Georgetown University Law Center.

On April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Woods v. Etherton without oral argument. -- Timothy Etherton was convicted in Michigan state court of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. His efforts to obtain post-conviction relief in state court--which related to his lawyer’s failure to raise a Confrontation Clause objection to the admission into evidence of the anonymous tip that led to his arrest--were rejected. A federal district court also rejected Etherton’s subsequent attempt to obtain federal habeas relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed that judgment. Etherton’s appellate counsel had been constitutionally ineffective, the Sixth Circuit concluded, and no fairminded jurist could conclude otherwise. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in a per curiam opinion issued without oral argument. Without reaching the Sixth Circuit’s holding that counsel had been constitutionally ineffective, the Supreme Court indicated that the Sixth Circuit had failed to apply the appropriate, deferential standard of review required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. With that in mind the Supreme Court explained, it would not be objectively unreasonable for a fair-minded judge to conclude that counsel’s failure to raise a Confrontation Clause objection to admission of the anonymous tip was due not to incompetence, but because the facts in the tip were uncontested and in any event consistent with Etherton’s defense. -- To discuss the case, we have Ronald Eisenberg, who is Deputy District Attorney, Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office.