Category: 3-LawSometimeCommentary

On March 28, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Betterman v. Montana. Brandon Thomas Betterman pled to and was sentenced for the offense of bail-jumping. He argued on appeal that a 14-month delay between the entry of his guilty plea and his sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed Betterman’s conviction and sentence, holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not extend from conviction to sentencing. A criminal defendant still retains, the court concluded, a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to have sentence imposed in a timely manner, without unreasonable delay--and the delay in this case was unacceptable--but any resulting prejudice to Betterman was speculative and not substantial and demonstrable. -- The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on the following issue: whether the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, protecting a criminal defendant from inordinate delay in final disposition of his case. -- To discuss the case, we have Anthony Johnstone, who is Associate Professor at University of Montana Alexander Blewett III School of Law.

On April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Nichols v. United States. Petitioner Nichols, a registered sex offender who moved from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his registration, was arrested, escorted to the United States, and charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA makes it a federal crime for certain sex offenders to “knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration,” and requires that offenders who move to a different State “shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status,” inform in person “at least 1 jurisdiction involved . . . of all changes” to required information. After conditionally pleading guilty, Nichols argued on appeal that SORNA did not require him to update his registration in Kansas. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction. -- By a vote of 8-0 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, holding that SORNA did not require Nichols to update his registration in Kansas once he departed the State. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. -- To discuss the case, we have James Barta, who is an Associate at MoloLamken LLP.

On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Luis v. U.S. In 2012, a grand jury indicted Luis for a variety of crimes relating to health care fraud. The government contended that she had fraudulently obtained some $45 million, and had spent all except $2 million of it. The government then initiated a civil proceeding to freeze Luis’ remaining assets, including those not traceable to the alleged fraud, to preserve them for payment of restitution and criminal penalties if she was convicted. Luis objected that the freeze violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by precluding her from using her own untainted funds--those not connected with the alleged crime--to hire counsel to defend her in her criminal case. The district court acknowledged that Luis might be unable to hire counsel of her choice but rejected her Sixth Amendment claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 11th Circuit and remanded the case. No single rationale, however, attracted the votes of five justices. Writing for a plurality, Justice Breyer delivered an opinion arguing, based on the nature of competing considerations, relevant legal tradition, and practical concerns, that Luis had a Sixth Amendment right to use her own “innocent” property to pay a reasonable fee for the assistance of counsel. The opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment of the Court--thereby providing a fifth vote to vacate and remand--but he did not agree with the plurality’s balancing approach and instead rested strictly on the Sixth Amendment’s text and common-law backdrop. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have John Malcolm, who is Director of the Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, and the Ed Gilbertson and Sherry Lindberg Gilbertson Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

On February 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC. In 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit against CRST Van Expedited (CRST) on behalf of approximately 270 female employees. When a number failed to appear for depositions, however, the district court barred the EEOC from pursuing their claims as a discovery sanction. The remaining claims were dismissed on various other grounds, including 67 claims that the district court dismissed for failure of the EEOC to separately investigate, find reasonable cause for, or attempt to conciliate them. In addition, the court awarded CRST some $4.46 million in attorney’s fees and expenses, on the basis that the claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but two claims, vacated the award of fees and costs, and remanded the case. On remand, one of the remaining claims was withdrawn and the other settled. CRST renewed its petition for fees, costs, and expenses, and the district court again awarded it approximately $4.6 million. -- On a second appeal the Eighth Circuit again reversed the award, finding that claims which had been dismissed for the EEOC’s failure to meet presuit obligations could not serve as grounds for an award, and remanding for an individualized determination as to whether other claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. -- The Supreme Court granted CRST’s subsequent petition for certiorari on the following question: whether a dismissal of a Title VII case, based on the EEOC’s total failure to satisfy its pre-suit investigation, reasonable cause, and conciliation obligations, can form the basis of an attorney’s fee award to the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). -- To discuss the case, we have Kenton J. Skarin, who is an Associate at Jones Day.

More than two weeks have passed since President Obama tapped Merrick Garland to fill Antonin Scalia’s vacant seat on the Supreme Court. But while their rationale has shifted somewhat, Senate Republican leaders remain as firm as ever in their refusal to hold confirmation hearings for the nominee. On this week’s episode, University of Chicago Law School professor Geoffrey R. Stone joins us to explain why the GOP’s intransigence is so threatening to the core institutions of federal government.

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On March 7, 2016, the Supreme Court decided V.L. v. E.L., a case involving an interstate dispute over custody of a child raised by a same-sex couple. A Georgia court entered a final judgment of adoption making petitioner V. L. a legal parent of the children that she and respondent E. L., her same-sex partner, had raised together from birth. V. L. and E. L. later separated while living in Alabama. V. L. asked the Alabama courts to enforce the Georgia judgment and grant her custody or visitation rights. The Alabama Supreme Court refused, holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution did not require the Alabama courts to respect the Georgia judgment. -- By a vote of 8-0 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court and remanded the case, holding in a per curiam opinion that the Alabama Supreme Court erred in refusing to grant the Georgia adoption judgment full faith and credit. -- To discuss the case, we have Robin Fretwell Wilson, who is the Roger and Stephany Joslin Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Family Law and Policy at University of Illinois College of Law.

On February 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Kingdomware Technologies v. United States. Kingdomware Technologies is a certified, service-disabled veteran owned small business, or SDVOSB--a special type of veteran-owned small business, or VOSB. In 2012, Kingdomware filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) when the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) awarded a contract to a Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contractor who was not a VOSB. Kingdomware argued that the award violated 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d)’s “Rule of Two.” That provision directs that VA contracting officers, except under certain circumstances, “shall award contracts on the basis of competition restricted to small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans if the contracting officer has a reasonable expectation that two or more small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans will submit offers and that the award can be made at a fair and reasonable price that offers best value to the United States.” -- Although the GAO agreed with Kingdomware and recommended a re-bid, the VA declined to follow the GAO recommendation and Kingdomware sued the VA in the Court of Federal Claims. That Court ruled in favor of the VA and Kingdomware appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims, concluding that Kingdomware’s interpretation of “shall award” failed to account for qualifying provisions elsewhere in the statute. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Circuit erred by adopting a construction of § 8127(d)'s mandatory set-aside for VOSBs that arguably rendered the “Rule of Two” discretionary at the option of the VA. -- To discuss the case, we have Michael Toth, who is a lawyer in Washington, D.C.

On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Wittman v. Personhuballah. In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District by increasing the percentage of African-American voters in the district. In 2013, plaintiffs, who reside in the Third District, sued state election officials, arguing that the District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court agreed and held the districting plan to be unconstitutional, but the U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its intervening decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. On remand, the district court held that the redistricting plan failed strict scrutiny and ordered the Virginia General Assembly to devise a remedial plan. When the Assembly did not do so the court devised its own remedial plan and ordered election officials to implement it. -- On further appeal, there are four questions now before the Supreme Court: (1) Whether the court below erred in failing to make the required finding that race rather than politics predominated in District 3, where there is no dispute that politics explains the Enacted Plan; (2) whether the court below erred in relieving plaintiffs of their burden to show an alternative plan that achieves the General Assembly's political goals, is comparably consistent with traditional districting principles, and brings about greater racial balance than the Enacted Plan; (3) whether, regardless of any other error, the finding of a Shaw violation by the court below was based on clearly erroneous fact-finding; (4) whether the majority erred in holding that the Enacted Plan fails strict scrutiny because it increased District 3's black voting-age population percentage above the benchmark percentage, when the undisputed evidence establishes that the increase better complies with neutral principles than would reducing the percentage and no racial bloc voting analysis would support a reduction capable of realistically securing Section 5 preclearance. -- To discuss the case, we have Derek Muller, who is Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law.

On March 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Simmons v. Himmelreich. This case arises from a lawsuit filed by federal prisoner Walter Himmelreich as the result of an assault by a fellow prisoner. Although several of Himmelreich’s claims were dismissed in an initial round of litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allowed two to proceed on remand, of which one was a “Bivens” claim made against certain officials in their individual capacities for failing to protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court ultimately dismissed the claim, concluding that the “judgment bar” of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) precluded Himmelreich from pursuing a Bivens action against the officials individually when his underlying FTCA claim against the government had failed. On a subsequent appeal the Sixth Circuit disagreed and again revived the Bivens claim, reasoning that the grounds on which the FTCA claim had failed--namely, an exception to liability--indicated a lack of subject matter jurisdiction that did not trigger the FTCA judgment bar. The federal officials sought certiorari. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether, in an FTCA action brought under Section 1346(b), a final judgment dismissing the claim on the ground that relief is precluded by one of the FTCA exceptions to liability, 28 U.S.C. § 2680, bars a subsequent action by the claimant against the federal employees whose acts gave rise to the FTCA claim. -- To discuss the case, we have Aaron Nielson, who is Associate Professor of Law at Brigham Young University Law School.

On March 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (consolidated with its companion case, Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust). -- Concerned that its public utilities were on the verge of insolvency but could not obtain Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief under federal law, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico attempted to circumvent this obstacle by passing its own municipal bankruptcy law. This law, the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act expressly provides different protections for creditors than those in federal Chapter 9. -- Investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico’s public utilities worried that it might seek relief under the new Puerto Rico law and sued in federal court, challenging the law’s validity and seeking injunctive relief. The district court enjoined the enforcement of the new law and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Puerto Rico sought certiorari. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code, although it does not apply to Puerto Rico, nevertheless preempts the Puerto Rico statute creating a mechanism for the Commonwealth’s public utilities to restructure their debts. Justice Alito is recused from this case. -- To discuss the case, we have David Skeel, who is the S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and who submitted an amicus brief in support of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.