Category: 3-LawSometimeCommentary

On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Amgen Inc v. Harris without oral argument. Former employees of an Amgen subsidiary had participated in a benefit plan that offered ownership of Amgen stock. When the value of Amgen stock fell in 2007, stockholders filed a class action against plan fiduciaries alleging a breach of fiduciary duties, including the duty of prudence, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially reversed a district court decision dismissing the class action complaint, the U.S. Supreme Court then vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case in light of the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, which set forth the standards for stating a claim for breach of the duty of prudence against fiduciaries who manage employee stock ownership plans. -- On remand, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its conclusion that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari. In a per curiam opinion the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit by a vote of 9-0, holding that the Circuit had failed to properly evaluate the complaint. In its current form, the Supreme Court concluded, the complaint failed to state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence. In remanding the case, however, the Court indicated that the district court could decide in the first instance whether the stockholders might amend their complaint in order to adequately plead a claim for breach of the duty of prudence. -- To discuss the case, we have George T. Conway III, who is Partner, Litigation at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana. Petitioner Montgomery was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana and received a mandatory sentence of life without parole. In 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Miller v. Alabama that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.” Montgomery sought state collateral relief, arguing that Miller rendered his mandatory life-without-parole sentence illegal. The trial court denied his motion, and his application for a supervisory writ was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which had previously held that Miller does not have retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review. -- Montgomery’s case presents the U.S. Supreme Court with two questions: (1) Whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana properly refused to give retroactive effect to Miller; and (2) Whether Miller adopts a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in prison. -- By a vote of 6-3 the Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative, reversing the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanding the case. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Zachary Bolitho, who is Assistant Professor at Campbell University School of Law.

A week after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, his former clerk Rachel Barkow shares fond memories of a mentor with whom she didn’t always agree politically. And legal scholar Akhil Reed Amar explains why Scalia didn’t always remain true to his originalist principles.

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Podcast production by Tony Field.

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On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Musacchio v. United States. Petitioner Musacchio was convicted in a jury trial on two counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court had incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute actually required, but the government had failed to object. On appeal, Musacchio argued that the government had failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction under this more stringent standard. He also argued that one of the counts on which he was convicted had been barred by a statute of limitations, but had not raised this objection at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected both challenges and affirmed Musacchio’s conviction. -- The question before the Supreme Court was twofold: (1) how should federal courts assess a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case when a jury instruction adds an element to the charged crime and the Government fails to object; and (2) can a defendant successfully raise the general federal criminal statute of limitations for the first time on appeal? -- By a vote of 9-0, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, holding that (1) the challenge to sufficiency of the evidence should be assessed against the elements of the charged crime, rather than the elements set forth in the erroneous jury instruction; and (2) the statute of limitations bar could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. -- To discuss the case, we have Mark H. Bonner, who is Associate Professor at Ave Maria School of Law.

On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided several energy cases consolidated under the heading Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association. These cases concern a practice called “demand re­sponse,” in which operators of wholesale markets pay electricity consumers for commitments not to use power at certain times. In the regulation challenged here, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required those market operators, in specified circumstances, to compensate the two services equivalently—that is, to pay the same price to demand response providers for conserving energy as to generators for making more of it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated this regulation, however, holding it beyond the FERC’s authority under the Federal Power Act as well as arbitrary and capricious, for failure to justify adequately a potential windfall to demand response providers. -- The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions: (1) Does the Federal Power Act permit FERC to regulate these demand response transactions at all, or does any such rule impinge on the States’ residual authority? (2) Even if FERC has the requisite statutory power, did FERC fail to justify adequately why demand response providers and electricity producers should receive the same compensation? -- By a vote of 6-2, the Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case, holding that (1) FERC did possess adequate regulatory authority under the Federal Power Act; and (2) FERC’s decision to compensate demand response providers at locational marginal price was not arbitrary and capricious. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito was recused from this case. -- To discuss the case, we have James Coleman, who is assistant professor at the University of Calgary, Faculty of Law and Haskayne School of Business.

On January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Sturgeon v. Frost. Sturgeon challenged a National Park Service (NPS) ban on the operation of hovercraft on the National River, part of which falls within the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve. The State of Alaska then intervened, challenging NPS’s authority to require its researchers to obtain a permit before engaging in studies of chum and sockeye salmon on the Alagnak River, part of which falls within the boundaries of the Katmai National Park and Preserve. Sturgeon and Alaska contended that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) precludes NPS from regulating activities on state-owned lands and navigable waters that fall within the boundaries of National Park System units in Alaska. The district court ruled in favor of the federal government, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment as to Sturgeon but ordered that Alaska’s case be dismissed for lack of standing. -- The question before the Court is whether ANILCA prohibits the National Park Service from exercising regulatory control over state, native corporation, and private Alaska land physically located within the boundaries of the National Park System. -- To discuss the case, we have Gale Norton, who served as the 48th U.S. Secretary of the Interior.

The sudden death on Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia on Saturday has unleashed huge shockwaves in both the presidential race and the legal community. Luckily, Slate has podcasts covering both areas. In this special joint episode, Amicus host Dahlia Lithwick joins Political Gabfest panelists Emily Bazelon and David Plotz to look at all the possible repercussions of Scalia’s death.

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On January 13, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. Sanchez Valle was charged by Puerto Rico prosecutors with the illegal sale of weapons and ammunition without a license in violation of Puerto Rico law. While that charge was pending, he was indicted by a federal grand jury for the same offense, based on the same facts, under federal law. He pled guilty to the federal indictment but sought dismissal of the Puerto Rico charges on Double Jeopardy grounds, arguing that Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico agreed but the Commonwealth appealed. -- The question now before the U.S. Supreme Court is whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the federal government are separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. -- To discuss the case, we have Scott Broyles, who is Professor at Charlotte School of Law.

On January 12, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida. The question before the Court was whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme--which Hurst contends does not require unanimity in the jury death recommendation or in the finding of underlying aggravating factors--violates the Sixth and/or Eighth Amendments in light of the Court’s 2002 decision Ring v. Arizona, which requires that the aggravating factors necessary for imposition of a death sentence be found by a jury. The Florida Supreme Court upheld Hurst’s death sentence. -- By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court and remanded the case, holding that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme did violate the Sixth Amendment in light of Ring. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for the Court was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Jack Park, who is Of Counsel with Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP.

On December 8, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged that the newly redrawn districts were underpopulated in Democratic-leaning districts and over-populated in Republican-leaning ones, and that the Commission had, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission countered that the population deviations were the result of attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. A three-judge district court ruled in favor of the Commission. -- There are two questions before the Supreme Court on appeal: (1) Whether the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justifies creating over-populated legislative districts that result in the devaluation of individual votes, violating the one-person, one-vote principle; and (2) whether the desire to obtain favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permits the creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle, and--even if creating unequal districts to obtain preclearance approval was once justified--whether this remains a legitimate justification after the Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder. -- To discuss the case, we have Mark F. Hearne, II, who is Partner at Arent Fox LLP.