Category: 3-LawSometimeCommentary

On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court decided California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities. Between 2007 and 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings raised capital through a number of public securities offerings. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) purchased some of these securities. In 2008, a putative class action alleging federal securities law violations was filed against respondents--various financial firms involved in underwriting the offerings--in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Because the complaint was filed on behalf of all persons who purchased the identified securities, petitioner CalPERS fell within the putative class. In 2011, however, CalPERS filed a separate action, alleging identical violations against respondent firms in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. That suit was then transferred and consolidated with other related litigation in the Southern District of New York. The New York class action then settled, but CalPERS opted out of the settlement. Respondents thereafter moved to dismiss CalPERS’ separate suit based on Securities Act language providing that “[i]n no event shall any such action be brought … more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public,” the CalPERS suit having fallen outside the three-year limit. CalPERS argued that the time limit was equitably tolled during the pendency of the class action, but the district court rejected the claim and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that CalPERS’ untimely filing of its individual complaint more than three years after the relevant securities offering was grounds for dismissal. The three-year limitation in the Securities Act, the Court indicated, is a “statute of repose” and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Mark Chenoweth, who is General Counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation.

Today's show is a deep dive into the current Constitutional status of affirmative action in higher education. We begin, however, with a question about Donald Trump from conservative listener Sage Scott.  Is it really a big deal to just listen to the Russians?  Couldn't you just pay them if their stuff turns out to be useful?  No.  The answer is no. In the main segment, the guys outline the current state of the law of affirmative action in higher education as set forth in Fisher v. University of Texas-Austin, 136 S.Ct. 1398 (2016) ("Fisher II"), and what that means in light of the Trump Administration's recent comments that it plans to focus DOJ resources on challenging college admission programs that (supposedly) disadvantage white people. Next, in a follow-up to the John Oliver defamation lawsuit we discussed in Episode 84, "Closed Arguments" returns with a dissection of the best legal brief ever written, an amicus curiae brief filed by Jamie Lynn Crofts of the ACLU of West Virginia in support of Oliver.  Andrew tries to contain his jealousy. Finally, we end with the answer to Thomas Take the Bar Exam Question #35 regarding a physician's duty regarding releasing patients who are a danger to themselves or others.  And don't forget to play along by following our Twitter feed (@Openargs) and/or our Facebook Page and quoting the Tweet or Facebook Post that announces this episode along with your guess and reason(s)! Recent Appearances Andrew had a busy week!  He was on the follow shows:

• Episode #17 of the  Squaring the Strange podcast
• Episode #14 of the Odd Atheist Friends podcast; and
• Episode #113 of the Utah Outcasts podcast.

Show Notes & Links

1. Here is a link to 52 U.S.C. § 30121, which you can read for yourself plainly prohibits virtually all contact between foreign nationals and any candidate for federal, state, or even local office.
2. You can read the August 1, 2017 New York Times story on how the Trump Administration plans to challenge affirmative action in college admissions here.
3. The most recent Supreme court case on affirmative action in higher education is Fisher v. University of Texas-Austin, 136 S.Ct. 1398 (2016) ("Fisher II"); Andrew also referenced Fisher I, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
4. We first discussed Bob Murray's defamation lawsuit against John Oliver in Episode #84, and you can read the ACLU's outstanding amicus brief here.

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On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, formerly known as Lynch v. Morales-Santana. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for derivative acquisition of U.S. citizenship from birth, by a child born abroad, when one parent is a U.S. citizen and the other is not. At the relevant time here, the INA required the U.S.-citizen parent to have ten years’ physical presence in the United States prior to the child’s birth, at least five of which were after attaining age 14. Although the rule applies in full to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, there is an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother, whose citizenship can be transmitted to a child born abroad if she has lived continuously in the United States for just one year prior to the child’s birth. -- Morales-Santana, who was born in the Dominican Republic, asserted U.S. citizenship from birth based on the citizenship of his father--but his father had fallen 20 days short of satisfying the requirement of five years’ physical presence after attaining age 14. In 2000, the government sought to remove Morales-Santana as a result of several criminal convictions, classifying him as alien rather than citizen because of his father’s failure to satisfy the full physical presence requirement. The immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s citizenship claim and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his subsequent motion to reopen proceedings on the claim that the INA’s gender-based rule violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause--but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding the differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers unconstitutional and acknowledging Morales-Santana’s U.S. citizenship. -- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a vote of 8-0, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that (1) the gender line Congress drew in the INA, creating an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother but not for such a father, to the physical-presence requirement, violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause as the Second Circuit had determined; but (2) the remedial course that Congress would most likely have chosen if apprised of this constitutional infirmity would have been not a broader application of the one-year exception but rather preservation of the five-year general rule; thus the Court cannot grant the relief Morales-Santana seeks. Going forward it falls to Congress to select a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender, but in the interim the five-year requirement applies prospectively to children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers just as with such fathers. -- Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, who is President, Committee for Justice; Legal Affairs Fellow, Freedom Works.

In today's episode, Andrew reluctantly -- but definitively -- opines that the Second Circuit got the law right in dismissing out the claims of Davino Watson, who argued that he was falsely imprisoned by the U.S. government for 3 1/2 years. In the pre-show segment, Andrew briefly introduces new FBI Director Christopher Wray as a good nominee by Donald Trump. After that, the guys tackle a follow-up question to Episode #91; namely, isn't "sexual orientation" already a protected class?  Doesn't the law just prohibit discrimination in general?  (No.) In our main segment, Andrew explains why statutes of limitation are necessary and why the Second Circuit got it right in dismissing out Watson's false imprisonment claim even though the circumstances are awful. Next, the guys break down Rod Wheeler's defamation lawsuit against Fox News.  Why is this part of Yodel Mountain?  Listen and find out! Finally, we end with an all-new (and fiendishly hard!) Thomas Takes the Bar Exam Question #35 about a hospital's duty to third parties when releasing a patient with homicidal ideation.  Remember that you can play along with #TTTBE by retweeting our episode Tweet along with your guess.  We'll release the answer on next Tuesday's episode along with our favorite entry! Recent Appearances Andrew had a busy week!  He was on the follow shows:

• Episode #17 of the  Squaring the Strange podcast
• Episode #14 of the Odd Atheist Friends podcast; and
• Episode #113 of the Utah Outcasts podcast.

Show Notes & Links

1. You can listen to the original discussion of anti-discrimination in employment in Episode #91, as well as read the text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
2. This is the trial court's decision in Watson v. U.S. (EDNY 2016), as well as the Second Circuit's decision from Sept. 1, 2017.
3. Here is the Complaint filed by Rod Wheeler against Fox News.

Support us on Patreon at:  patreon.com/law Follow us on Twitter:  @Openargs Facebook:  https://www.facebook.com/openargs/ And email us at openarguments@gmail.com Direct Download

For today's show, we revisit the topic first discussed in Opening Arguments Episode #60, namely, whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of "sex" implicitly extends to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "sexual orientation" as well. First, however, fan favorite "Breakin' Down the Law" returns with an explanation of civil and criminal asset forfeiture and a new policy announced by Attorney General (for now) Jeff Sessions. In the main segment, we contrast the amicus brief filed by the U.S. Department of Justice in Zarda v. Altitude Express with the 7th Circuit's opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana.  Find out why your government just submitted a brief arguing that employers have the right to hang a sign that says "no homosexuals need apply." After that, Patron Jordan Keith explains a bit more about the TOR browser as a follow-up to Opening Arguments Episode #88's discussion of U.S. v. Matish. Finally, we end with the answer to Thomas Take the Bar Exam Question #34 regarding the rape shield law, FRE 412.  Listen and find out if Thomas makes it back to .500!   And don't forget to play along by following our Twitter feed (@Openargs) and/or our Facebook Page and quoting the Tweet or Facebook Post that announces this episode along with your guess and reason(s)! Recent Appearances: Andrew was just a guest on Episode 15 of Molly Unmormon's "Doubting Dogma" podcast -- give it a listen! Show Notes & Links

1. The relevant statutes for asset forfeiture are 18 U.S.C. § 983 and 21 U.S.C. § 853, and you can also read the 2015 Holder memorandum prohibiting "adoptive forfeitures" by clicking here.
2. We first discussed Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana in Episode #60.
3. And here is the link to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
4. Here is a link to the U.S.'s amicus curiae brief in Zarda v. Altitude Express.
5. This is the text of the opinion in U.S. v. Matish, which we first discussed in Episode #88.
6. And finally, you can read Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by clicking here.

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In today's episode, Andrew definitively opines that the Presidential pardon power includes the right to self-pardon. We begin, however, with "Andrew Was Wrong."  This time, he was wrong about Thor Heyerdahl, but right about the fate of Ken Ham's Ark Encounter. In our main segment, the guys analyze the recent claims by Laurence Tribe, Richard Painter, and Norm Eisen that Donald Trump does not have the power to pardon himself and find it less than persuasive. Next, Andrew briefly discusses the legality of Trump's tweet regarding transgender individuals serving in the military. Finally, we end with an all-new Thomas Takes the Bar Exam Question #34 about introducing a rape victim's sexual history into evidence.  Remember that you can play along with #TTTBE by retweeting our episode Tweet along with your guess.  We'll release the answer on next Tuesday's episode along with our favorite entry! Recent Appearances Andrew's talk before the Lehigh Valley Humanists is now up on YouTube. Show Notes & Links

1. We first discussed AIG's Ark Encounter land sale in Opening Arguments episode #88.
2. This is the press release from Answers in Genesis regarding their Ark Encounter fraud, and here is one news account of how the City suspended the tax breaks for the Ark Encounter and the subsequent revocation of the sale.
3. This is the Tribe/Painter/Eisen article in the Washington Post arguing that Trump doesn't have the power to pardon himself.
4. Here is a link to the 1974 Lawton memo.
5. This is a link to the Autobiography of Charles Biddle; you'll want to turn to page 306-08 for the Aaron Burr story.
6. This is "The Law as King and the King as Law" from the Hastings Law Quarterly 20:7.
7. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
8. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
9. Here is a link to Gov. Stevens's self-pardon in 1856.
10. This is a link to Mayor James G. Woodward's self-pardon for public drunkenness in 1901.
11. Finally, this is the Newsweek article referenced on the show that discusses self-pardons.

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On June 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Maslenjak v. United States. At the close of the Bosnian civil war, Divna Maslenjak sought refugee status for herself and her family in the U.S. due to fear of persecution regarding their Serbian identity in modern-day Bosnia and the threat of reprisal against her husband, who she claimed had evaded military conscription in the Bosnian Serb militia. After the family was granted refugee status and Maslenjak became a U.S. citizen, a U.S. court convicted Maslenjak’s husband, Ratko, on two counts of falsifying claims regarding Serbian military service on U.S. government documents, since Ratko had in fact served in the Serbian military. When Ratko applied for asylum to avoid deportation, Divna Maslenjak admitted to lying about her husband’s military service and was charged with two counts of naturalization fraud. At her trial, jurors were told that a naturalization fraud conviction could be carried out for false claims in Maslenjak’s application process, even if the claims did not affect whether she was approved. Convicted on both counts, Divna Maslenjack was stripped of her citizenship. The Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction. -- By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that (1) the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) -- which prohibits "procur[ing], contrary to law, the naturalization of any person" -- makes clear that, to secure a conviction, the federal government must establish that the defendant's illegal act played a role in her acquisition of citizenship; (2) when the underlying illegality alleged in a Section 1425(a) prosecution is a false statement to government officials, a jury must decide whether the false statement so altered the naturalization process as to have influenced an award of citizenship; and (3) measured against this analysis, the jury instructions in this case were in error, and the government's assertion that any instructional error was harmless if left for resolution on remand. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Vikrant P. Reddy, who is Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.

On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Ziglar v. Abbasi, which was consolidated with the cases Ashcroft v. Abbasi , and Hasty v. Abbasi. Ziglar v. Abbasi was part of a series of lawsuits brought by Muslim, South Asian, and Arab noncitizens who were detained after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and treated as “of interest” in the ensuing government investigation. These plaintiffs contended, among other things, that the conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The defendants included high-level officials in the Department of Justice (DOJ) such as Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI director Robert Mueller, and Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar, as well as various detention officials. Some of the parties reached settlements, and the district court eventually dismissed some of the allegations against the DOJ officials for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claims, but otherwise reversed most of the district court’s judgment. Plaintiffs, the Second Circuit held, had adequately pleaded claims for violations of substantive due process, equal protection, the Fourth Amendment, and civil conspiracy, and Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants then sought, and the Supreme Court granted, a petition for writ of certiorari. -- By a vote of 4-2, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and vacated and remanded in part, the judgment of the Second Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that (1) the limited reach of actions brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents informs the decision whether an implied damages remedy should be recognized in this case; (2) considering the relevant special factors in this case, a Bivens-type remedy should not be extended to the "detention policy claims" -- the allegations that the executive officials and wardens violated the detainees' due process and equal protection rights by holding them in restrictive conditions of confinement, and the allegation that the wardens violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by subjecting the detainees to frequent strip searches -- challenging the confinement conditions imposed on the detainees pursuant to the formal policy adopted by the executive officials in the wake of the September 11 attacks; (3) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit erred in allowing the prisoner-abuse claim against Warden Dennis Hasty to go forward without conducting the required special-factors analysis; and (4) the executive officials and wardens are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to respondents' civil conspiracy claims. -- Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and V, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Kennedy also delivered an opinion with respect to Part IV–B, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. -- To discuss the case, we have David B. Rivkin, who is a Partner at Baker & Hostetler LLP.

Today's show features an in-depth interview with Kirstin Beswick and Ben Knight of NorthPod Law UK, often referred to (by us) as the "Opening Arguments of England."  Join all four of us as we discuss media, politics, Brexit, and maybe -- just maybe -- reasons for optimism about the future of politics. Due to the length of the interview, we don't have any other segments, but we do end, as always, with the answer to Thomas Take the Bar Exam Question #33 regarding reasonable suspicion to search an auto after a traffic stop.  Don't forget to play along by following our Twitter feed (@Openargs) and/or our Facebook Page and quoting the Tweet or Facebook Post that announces this episode along with your guess and reason(s)! Recent Appearances: None!  Have us on your show! Show Notes & Links

1. You can check out NorthPod UK's blog by clicking here.

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On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Hernandez v. Mesa. In 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, died after being shot near the border between El Paso, Texas and Juarez, Mexico by Jesus Mesa, Jr., a U.S. Border Patrol Agent. Hernandez’s parents, who contend that their son was on Mexican soil at the time of the shooting, sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. After hearing the case en banc, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of Mesa, concluding that Hernandez could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim and that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity on the parents’ Fifth Amendment claim. -- In granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court directed the parties to address whether Hernandez’s parents could even raise their claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, which, sovereign immunity notwithstanding, recognized an implied right of action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights. Ultimately, the Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case. -- In a per curiam opinion, the Court underscored that a Bivens remedy is not available when "special factors counsel[] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress," and noted that the Court had recently clarified in Ziglar v. Abbasi “what constitutes a special factor counselling hesitation.” The Fifth Circuit, the Court directed, should on remand resolve in the first instance the extent to which Abbasi may bear on this case. The Court acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit did not address the Bivens issue because that court had concluded that Hernandez lacked any Fourth Amendment rights to assert--but the Supreme Court considered it imprudent to resolve such a consequential question without a resolution of the Bivens issue first. Finally, the Court indicated that the Fifth Circuit had erred in finding qualified immunity for Mesa regardless of any Fifth Amendment violation because the Fifth Circuit had relied on facts about Hernandez’s nationality and ties to the United States that were unknown to Mesa at the time of the shooting. -- Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have Steven Giaier, who is Senior Counsel, House Committee on Homeland Security.